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RHETORIC AND ITS ABUSES: HOW TO OPPOSE LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY WHILE SPEAKING ITS LANGUAGE
GuY HAARSCHER*

I.

VICO AND PERELMAN

It is difficult to measure the importance of Vico's 1708 address for our
time. What he said-in particular his criticism of the Cartesian philosophy
of education-has been validated many times, notably in the second part of
the twentieth century. It seems thus that the revolutionary edge of his discourse has been lost precisely because of its contemporary success. Chaim
Perelman began his The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation,
which was published just fifty years ago, by criticizing the dominant paradigm of Descartes' idkes claires et distinctes.' He wanted, as it is well
known, to rehabilitate the ancient, essentially Aristotelian, rhetoric, 2 by
insisting on the necessity of educating people in dealing with an existential
and social reality that is inaccessible to the methodology of clear and distinct ideas. 3 In brief, if people thought that the only authentic rationality
was Cartesian, then the human and social reality would be considered to* President of the Perelman Center for the Philosophy of Law, Free University of Brussels
(ULB). When a foreign-language text is quoted, all translations provided herein are the author's own
unless otherwise noted.
1. "The publication of a treatise dedicated to argumentation and to its connection with an old
tradition, namely, Greek rhetoric and dialectics, constitutes a break with a conception of reason and
reasoning stemming from Descartes...." CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, TRAITt
DE L'ARGUMENTATION I (l'Universitd de Bruxelles, 5th ed. 1988) (1958) [hereinafter TRAIT]. "It is
him [Descartes] who... wanted to consider as rational only demonstrations which, from clear and
distinct ideas, transferred, with the help of apodictical proofs, the self-evidence of the axioms to all
theorems." Id. at 2. For the English edition, see CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW
RHETORIC (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1969) (1958).
2. See TRAITE, supra note 1, at 6-12, where Perelman justifies the connection of argumentation
with Aristotelian rhetoric rather than dialectics. The main reason for such a choice is the following:
rhetoric always implies that an argumentation is developed before an audience.
3. Id. at 3 ("Must we draw the conclusion, from that evolution of logics, and the incontestable
progresses it made, that reason is totally incompetent in the domains which evade calculation, and that
where neither experience nor logical deduction can provide us with the solution of a problem, we have
nothing left except abandoning ourselves to irrational forces, to our instincts, to suggestion or violence?"). In order to solve this central problem, Perelman tried first to discover a "logic of value judgments." He soon abandoned that quest and looked instead for a rehabilitation of ancient rhetoric. See
CH. PERELMAN, L'EMPIRE RHtTORIQUE: RHETORIQUE ET ARGUMENTATION 7 (1977) [hereinafter
EMPIRE].
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tally irrational. Perelman's aim was to build a new rationality-he called it
the "reasonable" 4-that would be less demanding in terms of conviction
than geometry and formal logic.
Vico himself, in his address, insisted-as Perelman would do so many
times in his work-on the middle position of the "verisimilar" (verisimilithe probable, the credible, the plausible), 5 between truth and falsity. If Cartesian methodology and the notion of "hyperbolic doubt" dominate education, the probable and the false will both be rejected in the darkness of the
Platonic Cave. Human action and values will therefore be considered irrational, and the space will be open for irrationalism and "decisionism." Actually, of course, between Arnaud and Nicole's conceptions of education
and the situation after 1945, when Perelman began to write his important
articles on justice, there is a meaningful difference: the authors of the
Logique de Port-Royal6 thought that it was possible to apply clear and distinct ideas to the conduct of life (I do not take into account here Descartes'
morale provisoire7), whereas the neo-positivists, accepting, grossly speaking, the same paradigm, would consider it impossible to apply Cartesian
rationality to values, ethics, politics, and substantive justice. 8 But for
Perelman, both positions, understood as they had been by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (the dogmatic and the skeptic), 9 rested on the same

4. See CHAIM PERELMAN, LE RAISONNABLE ET LE DERAISONNABLE EN DROIT (1984).
5. In his address, Vico takes the example of the physician who is always obliged to adapt his
acquired knowledge to a particular and changing reality. GIAMBATTISTA VICO, ON THE STUDY
METHODS OF OUR TIME 31-32 (Elio Gianturco trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1709) [hereinafter
STUDY METHODS]. Plato makes the same point against abstract laws in The Stateman. PLATO, The
Statesman, in THE STATESMAN, PHILEBUS, ION 5 (Harold N. Fowler & W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1925). Vico says that the closer one is to the concrete, the more the verisimilar, which is
less ambitious but more efficient, prevails over the true. The verisimilar provides the politician, the
judge, the physician, and even the moral theologian, with a rule for action.
6. ANTOINE ARNAULD & PIERRE NICOLE, LA LOGIQUE OU L'ART DE PENSER (Pierre Clair &
Frangois Girbal eds., Presses Universitaires de France 1965) (1662).
7. See 6 RENt DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA METHODE, in OEUVRES DE DESCARTES 105-08
(Charles Adam & Paul Tannery eds., 1982) [hereinafter DISCOURS DE LA METHODE] ("And finally, as it
is not enough, before commencing to rebuild the house in which we live, that it be pulled down, and
materials and builders provided, or that we engage in the work ourselves, according to a plan which we
have beforehand carefully drawn out, but as it is likewise necessary that we be furnished with some
other house in which we may live commodiously during the operations, so that I might not remain
irresolute in my actions, while my reason compelled me to suspend myjudgement, and that I might not
be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible felicity, I formed a provisory code of
morals, composed of three or four maxims, with which I am desirous to make you acquainted.").
8. "It is precisely to that conclusion that the positivists came: for them, value judgments had no
cognitive value at all, no verifiable meaning." EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 8. See the criticism of Stevenson, Hare, and Ayer by PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (1978).

9. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 296-97 (Norman Kemp Smith trans.,
Palgrave MacMillan 2d. rev. ed. 2003) (1781). Vico considers that Cartesianism is the principal cause
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intellectual soil.l0 It was because the only kind of acceptable rationality
was to be found in the M~ditationsMtaphysiques I and the Discours de la
Mthode12 that, philosophers having discovered that human and social reality was unamenable to it, they deemed such a reality irrational.
In the very beginning of the eighteenth century, Vico had in a certain
sense predicted such a "disenchantment" of the (ethical) world, 13 to use
Max Weber's formula. 14 Such an assessment was already present in his
address, or, to put it in a more dramatic way, in his "lament." Arnaud was
referring to Descartes in his struggle against the confusion of the mind. But
Vico considered that such a method of education, far from eliminating the
human predicament or alienation, would only aggravate it.15 Cartesianism
excluded, he said, the topics from the method of teaching; it was only based
16
on what Vico called "critique" (critica), that is, clear and distinct ideas.
Topics are intrinsically linked to the art of acquiring knowledge and being
able to use it; they are also necessary for the conduct of a good life. The
topics are related to the art of asking the good questions, finding the best
arguments (this goes back to Bacon), and gathering the maximum possible
relevant information about a problem. Topics should come before critica
for at least two reasons. First, topics (general and particular) are related to
imagination and memory, which are dominant in the minds of young people and must not be hindered by a premature resort to critica. Second, topics are necessary for asking the good questions. In a sense, we might add
from a twenty-first century perspective that critica do not prevent us from
attaining trivial and dispensable truths. Suppose they have been verified (or
of a widespread scepticism. Giambattista Vico, Letter of 20 January 1726 to Edoardo de Vitry, in 16
NEW VICO STUDIES 42 (Giorgio A. Pinton trans., 1998) [hereinafter Letter of20 January1726].
10. "But whether we take into consideration rationalist philosophers or the ones that are called
antirationalists, all continue the Cartesian tradition through the limitation imposed on the idea of reason." TRAITE, supranote 1,at 4.
II. See RENt DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS MtTAPHYSIQUES (Quadrige 6th ed. 2004) (1641).
12. See DISCOURS DE LA METHODE, supra note 7.

13. This notion was introduced by Weber in the second edition of THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans.,

Dover 2003)

(1920).

See generally THE

PROTESTANT ETHIC TURNS 100 (William H. Swatos, Jr. & Lutz Kaelber eds., 2005).
14. In his Letter of 20 January 1726, supra note 9, Vico describes a general exhaustion of intelligence. The Cartesian method has paralyzed the inventivity and creativity of philosophers. People do not
read the classics anymore, and they rely, because of Descartes' rejection of the tradition of scholasticism, on their intuition of the "clear" and "distinct." Everyone breaks off with all traditions and only
trusts their personal maxims, to the detriment of the common sense and the common good. The analysis
of the letter can be found in OLIVIER REMAUD, LES ARCHIVES DE L'HUMANITt (2004).
15. See Henry J. Perkinson, Giambattista Vico and "The Method of Studies in Our Times ": A
Criticism of Descartes' Influence on Modern Education,2 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 30, 34 (1962).

16. "Modem philosophical 'critique' is the common instrument of all our sciences and arts."
STUDY METHODS, supra note 5,at 6; see id. at 6 n.2 (translator's note referencing the Cartesian
method).
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falsified, in the Popperian sense); they have been established by resorting
to clear and distinct ideas. But they do not touch anything important. In
order to attain des signes qui nousforcent d penser ("signs that force us to
think"), 17 it is necessary to enter into a reflexive process before the "critical" phase. Such a process is based on topics, memory, and imagination,
which Vico thinks are essential for the education of the youths.' 8 Thus, in a
certain way, the precedence of topica over critica anticipates the ascent of
argumentation, even in the realm of "exact" sciences. Bacon, for instance,
when he spoke of the problem of the light and the heavy, enumerated a
certain number of questions that were, according to him, necessary to look
at the chosen object. 19 These questions are as essential as the answers that
will be given-when possible-by using clear and distinct ideas (critica).
If the critique is the art of the true discourse, Vico summarizes, so the topics are the art of the fecund discourse.
As far as good life, law, and ethics are concerned, the shortcomings
and perverse effects of a Cartesian education are maybe still more visible.
If one bases the reasoning on truth, one will not observe human nature because it is uncertain. 20 This anticipates Vico's theses in the Scienza Nuova
(published in 1725 and 1730), and in particular the famous motto: verum
andfactum convertuntur.We can only obtain a "Cartesian" truth (that is, a
truth immunized from any, even a small, possibility of doubt) about what
we have done: this is valid, for instance, in mathematics (the case of history
and philology in the Scienza Nuova is more complex, but it remains that the
"new" science studies the world made by human beings). Anyway, we have
not "made" the human mind. We are therefore condemned to the verisimili
in the conduct of our private and civic life. This reminds us of Sartre saying, in Being and Nothingness,2 ' that we are condemned to freedom (Vico
explicitly relates the uncertainty and confusion in human life to liberty).
Thus, Cartesian education prevents students from being educated into pru-

17. See GILLES DELEUZE, PROUST ET LES SIGNES 24 (Presses Universitaires de France 3d ed.
1971).
18.

STUDY METHODS, supra note 5, at 13-14. Vico states:

Just as the old age is powerful in reason, so is adolescence in imagination. Since imagination
has always been esteemed a most favorable omen of future development, it should in no way
be dulled. Furthermore, the teacher should give the greatest care to the cultivation of the pupil's memory, which, though not exactly the same as imagination, is almost identical with it.
The importance of "topics" is emphasized throughout Vico's text.
19. See Perkinson, supra note 15, at 36.
20. "Nature and life are full of incertitude; the foremost, indeed, the only aim of our 'arts' is to
assure us that we have acted rightly. Criticism is the art of true speech; 'ars topica,' of eloquence."

STUDY METHODS, supra note 5, at 15.
21.

See J.P. SARTRE, L'ETRE ET LE NEANT 515 (1943).
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dence (Aristotelian phronesis) and common sense, which are essential for
individual and political life.
Cartesian education does not only "pervert" the young. It also disorients the masses, as they must be persuaded by concrete arguments, related
to "occasion" and "choice": the elite educated in the Cartesian method are
not able to make an argument persuasive, that is, to make truth "probable"
or credible. In short, such an elite is not able to use verisimili, which are of
primordial importance to the social and political life.
It is here that, it seems to me, a fundamental question must be raised,
which concerns both Vico and Perelman. How can we make a meaningful
difference between "good" rhetoric and a confused, irrational discourse,
full of paralogisms, that is, involuntary errors of reasoning, or-worse-a
deliberately manipulated speech (sophistry)?22 This is an essential problem,
as a recourse to phronesis, good reasons (being less powerfully convincing
than mathematical rationality), and common sense gives a new legitimacy
(as Hannah Arendt rightly emphasized 23) to doxa. But how can we be sure,
the Cartesians will say, that the "weakening" of rationality that is entailed
by new rhetoric and the use of general and particular topica will not open
the door to demagogues and sophists? Vico was accused of being an antiintellectualist, and of wanting to educate people to become courtiers instead
of philosophers. 24 This is a very important point: paying court to someone
always involves an element of flattery, or at least of strategy. And thus, will
such an education lead to the following alternative (or dilemma): domination or instrumentalization of the audience? 25 If the latter must be persuaded, will not the orator be tempted to flatter it or to disorient it by
playing on passions and emotions? Indeed, if one must persuade an audience of the validity of a position, the only possibility of avoiding blind
acceptance of what the audience already knows (its own "premises"), the
only possibility of getting one's way, will be in manipulating the audience.
Vico himself recognizes that there is a tension between individual judgment and authority: in his autobiography, he explicitly affirms that he does
not want to go back to the domination of authority, but that he would like
22. Vico attacks both Descartes and the sophists for having broken the unity of philosophy and
eloquence.
23. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Philosophy and Politics,57 Soc. REs. 73 (1990).
24. "To the accusation that he wants to produce courtiers instead of philosophers, Vico replies that
he wants 'philosophers of the court,' who 'indeed love the truth, but at the same time love what seems
so, followers indeed of honesty, but also followers of that which receives universal approval."' Perkinson, supra note 15, at 41.
25. I once criticized Perelman for not giving enough arguments to solve that problem. See Guy
Haarscher, La Rh~torique de la Raison Pratique:R~flexions sur lArgumentation et la Violence, in 33
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE: LA NOUVELLE RHETORIQUE 110 (1979).
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to find a synthesis between the latter and Descartes' individualism. 26 Such
a tension is reflected in the ambiguity of rhetoric: common sense, prudence,
opinion, verisimili, etc. can be interpreted in a conservative way as involving a respect of traditions and the "authority of the eternal yesterday" (to
use another Weberian expression). But on the other hand, one can develop-as Hannah Arendt did-an "open" conception of opinion, being
related to the art of democratic controversy. One thing is sure: if people are
educated in the Cartesian way, they will confuse the "probable" and the
false; they will not be able to discriminate between sound non-formal argumentation and paralogisms or sophistry. One can at least assume that it is
only if they have been trained in rhetoric that they will be able to discern
the difference between, on the one hand, a reasoning that, although not
based on absolute proofs and total clarity of the notions, would be sufficiently convincing to support a reasonable "civic" action, and, on the other
hand, pure demagoguery.
II.

Two KINDS

OF CONFUSION

I would like to apply this reflection to an analysis of the rhetoric that
is being used in contemporary debates concerning the defense of the values
of liberal democracy. As values are concerned, we are here in the domain
of argumentation (the rhetorical "empire") in the Perelmanian sense. My
main point is the following: nowadays, human rights and liberal democracy
constitute as it were the fundamental values of the political sphere. Such a
primacy is not only, of course, recognized in Western democracies, but also
in international legal instruments such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human rights, the 1966 Covenants, respectively on Civil and Political
Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as in many
other documents that deal with more specific human rights topics. But as
we know, people very often only pay lip service to these political values.

26. Vico states:
We are certainly in debt to Descartes, who wanted his own feeling to be the rule of truth, because for everything to rest on authority was a servitude too vile [to endure]. We are in his
debt because he wanted order in thinking, because previously men were thinking in a much
too disorderly way with all those obicies secundo; but that only his judgment must be employed and only the geometrical method-that is too much.
Now would be the time to go back to a middle ground between these extremes [of authority and private judgment]: to follow one's own judgment, but with some respect for authority; to employ some order, but only one that the facts will support ....
"
GIAMBATTISTA VICO, Second Response to an Article in the Giornale de' Letterati d'Italia, in ON THE
MOST ANCIENT WISDOM OF THE ITALIANS UNEARTHED FROM THE ORIGINS OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE

150, 184 (L.M. Palmer trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1988) (1710).
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Actually, schematically speaking, there are two opposed ways of trying to evade the constraints of human rights and the values of liberal democracy. I shall call the first one the "frontal attack": the "enemy"
explicitly defends values that are radically at odds with liberal-democratic
principles. For instance, the opponent defends an authoritarian conception
of political power (fascism, Nazism, Soviet communism ...), or a dog-

matic conception of religious power (imposition of the law of God on earth,
necessary eradication of the infidels, etc.). Such a rhetoric is very influential today, for instance-but not only-in the Islamic world. As everybody
knows, it raises very serious problems for peace and security. The international instruments on human rights are explicitly negated in the name of
other values. But this is not my present topic.
I am interested here in the second, totally opposite, strategy: in order
to be at least heard by the democratic community, the "enemy" uses the
language of liberal democratic values. By doing so, he or she very often
succeeds in radically distorting the language of human rights. I shall call
that strategy the "Trojan horse," or, to use another metaphor, "the wolf in
sheep's clothing." The strategy is fundamentally related to demagoguery
and, more subtly, to a sophistical distortion of reasoning. The more we
consider the values of liberal democracies to be simple, "clear," and "distinct," the less we can see behind these apparently unproblematic notions,
which so many people seem to respect, to uncover some hidden controversies, or a sheer manipulation of the language of human rights. In our times,
dominated by political correctness, when so many deeply controversial
notions are superficially considered clear and distinct, Vico's lament keeps
all its topicality.
Perelman once defined philosophy as "a systematic study of confused
notions. ' 27 This definition has at least two different meanings. First, in
non-formal argumentation, we are confronted with notions that are confused because the interlocutors are governed by prejudices. Prejudice is a
distortion and a simplification of reality that necessarily entails confusion.
Secondly, after discussing the matter, we are left with a certain "remnant"
of confusion. But the latter absence of clarity and distinction is not similar
to the first meaning of the term. We might say in an ironic way that "confusion" is a... confused notion. Before "entering" the Perelmanian "realm of
argumentation," "confusion" means prejudice; in and after the (unending)
discussion, "confusion" means that there are still controversies related to a
27. "One can draw the conclusion, which might seem disrespectful, that the proper object of
philosophy is the systematic study of confused notions." CHAIM PERELMAN, De laJustice, in ETHIQUE
ET DROIT 17 (1990) [hereinafter De laJustice].
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certain irreducible vagueness in the terms we use. A lack of clarity in the
latter sense is normal, notably in democracy: we use a language that is
natural, as opposed to an artificial (formalized) language. 28 The emphasis
put on certain meanings will always be to a certain degree dependent on
some irreducible feelings (a preference for liberty, or for solidarity, etc.), an
immersion in a cultural tradition that we are not able to completely objectivize, some presently unfalsifiable predictions and hypotheses concerning
the future, etc. This is one of the reasons why, in democracy, we need at a
certain point to decide, that is, to vote. All interlocutors are equal in such a
context, they share a common loyalty towards the res publica, and they
enjoy the same freedom to interpret what the defense of the common good
commands. Actually, there is another cause for the existence of a residual
"confusion" even after a supposedly rational discussion, where the final say
29
belongs to-as Habermas would say--"the force of the better argument" :
political problems (in a very general sense of the term) are necessarily
more or less urgent, so deliberation and discussion must stop at a certain
point. The situation is the same for judges. Of course, the idea that a discussion taking place without deadlines because of its non-urgent character
would lead to complete clarity and distinctness is untenable: as Kant had
seen it, metaphysicians disagree as much as do people living and acting in
the world of doxa and being confronted with political problems, when time
30
is a scarce resource.
Such a very rapidly sketched difference between two meanings of
"confusion" is the point of departure for the kind of research I would like to
present in this paper. Let us first briefly analyze in more detail the notion of
confusion that exists before discussion. 3 1 In such a context, there exists a
possibility of deliberate manipulation, that is, of sophistry. My aim is to

28. See TRArt, supranote 1, at 178-85 (discussing "clarification and darkening of notions").
29. "[T]he communicative structure of rational discourse can ensure that all relevant contributions
are heard and that the unforced force of the better argument alone determines the 'yes' or 'no' responses
of the participants." JORGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
THEORY 37 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., The MIT Press 1998) (1996).
30. That phenomenon is particularly dramatic in emergency situations, when time runs still faster
than in normal situations. Vico insisted in his Address on the time factor in the context of trials.
In pressing, urgent affairs, which do not admit of delay or postponement, as most frequently
occurs in our law courts--especially when it is a question of criminal cases, which offer to the
eloquent orator the greatest opportunity for the display of his powers-it is the orator's business to give immediate assistance to the accused, who is usually granted only a few hours in
which to plead his defense. Our experts in philosophical criticism, instead, whenever they are
confronted with some dubious point, are wont to say: "Give me some time to think it over!"
STUDY METHODS, supra note 5, at 15. For a good analysis of decision-making in emergency situations,
see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS N AN AGE OF TERROR (2004).

31. Of course, in a sense, discussion has always already, as Heidegger would have said, begun:
my idea of a confusion related to a "pure" prejudice is evidently a pedagogical, artificial device.
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show, by using some contemporary examples essentially based on the (often hidden) controversies concerning free speech, that deliberative democracy is highly vulnerable to such a distortion. I said previously that there
were two completely different rhetorical strategies used by the adversaries
of liberal democracy to attack it. (Of course, between these two opposed
poles, there are many possible intermediary positions.) The first strategy
possesses at least a virtue: its real clarity. The values and aims are stated in
a rather straightforward way. For instance, liberal democracy is considered
by the censor to be against religion, as it replaces the law of God by the law
of "We the People," emanating from the social contract. But such a frontal
attack is not convincing at all in the liberal democratic community because
it challenges the very premise of any successful argument that might be
made in such a context. Therefore, another approach is more and more
often being used: here the opponent uses the language of liberal democracy, by subtly distorting the meaning of the concepts and values that are at
the core of human rights and democracy. Such a distortion permeates the
general discussion in the polis, so that at a certain point even democrats
acting in good faith fall prey to such a sophistic manipulation. Of course,
the strategy I call the "wolf in sheep's clothing" has the disadvantage (for
us democrats) of taking the interlocutors off-guard: as they think they are
confronted with someone accepting liberal-democratic values, they do not
see the danger--or at least the intellectual challenge-they are exposed to.
And so, as I said in the beginning, the democratic fortress must not be
stormed: the enemy is already inside, as a Trojan horse.
III. THE DANISH CARTOONS AND "TRANSLATION"
In order to develop my argument, I shall begin by reexamining a very
difficult problem that concerns some specific limits to free speech that are
related either to religion (blasphemy) or to race (racist speech). I would like
to analyze the rhetoric which is used today not only in the public debates
but also sometimes by judges sitting on a high court (at least in Europe). I
shall first analyze a sequence of events that took place in 2005 when the
Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten published the now infamous cartoons on
the Prophet Muhammad. 32 Let us, as far as our problem is concerned,
summarize the sequence as follows: when the Danish journalists were
threatened by Muslim extremists, some newspapers in other European

32. The cartoons were published on September 30, 2005. See generally Guy Haarscher, Free

Speech, Religion, and the Right to Caricature, in CENSORIAL SENSITIVITIES:
RELIGION IN A FUNDAMENTALIST WORLD 309-28 (Andrds Saj6 ed., 2007).

FREE SPEECH AND
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countries decided to republish the cartoons, not necessarily because they
thought that they revealed a good and wise editorial policy, but out of solidarity with the threatened individuals, and in defense of free speech as a
central value of liberal democracies. Now, in a sense, one might easily
believe that these cartoons were blasphemous. Of course, they could also
be read in a political context, for instance by giving them the meaning of a
critique of a "human, all too human" instrumentalization of religion. Whatever interpretation one decided to give to the cartoons (the meaning of a
drawing is always still more open than the meaning of a discursive expression), freedom of expression had to be protected. From the point of view of
the (more or less violent) opponents of the journalists, the meaning of the
caricatures was clear: it amounted to an offense to the Prophet of Allah,
that is, an insult to God-in other terms, an outrageous blasphemy. One
immediately sees the danger, for the advocates of the Jyllands Posten, of
trying to show that the drawings, after all, were not blasphemous: it would
have meant that if that had been the case, the journalists would have been
rightly convicted. "Another such victory and I am undone. '33
Thus, it would be safer for the future of freedom of expression to accept that the cartoons can reasonably be interpreted as being blasphemous
or sacrilegious, and that this should be protectedspeech. At least the situation would be intellectually clear, although defending such a position
would for obvious reasons be physically dangerous. The anti-blasphemy
statutes that still exist in some European countries are, as it were, remnants
of a time when religion was officially "established" 34 and protected by the
secular power. The conflict was between the "dissident" individual and a
theologico-political entity. Now in pluralist societies, religion in general,
and a particular faith, should not be immune from criticism. The problem is
not only a formal one. It is very important for us to begin with a clear characterization of the nature of the conflict that took place in Denmark, and
then-this is unavoidable in an era of global communication-throughout
the world. Some journalists writing (and drawing) for a newspaper exercised their right to free speech and were accused of blasphemy. For the
moment, the question is not whether blasphemy is a legitimate limitation of
33. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion
of collective defamation used by the majority).
34. There still exist some established and official religions in Europe: Anglicanism in England,
Presbyterianism in Scotland, Lutheranism in Denmark, Lutheranism and the Orthodox Church in
Finland, the Orthodox Church in Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, etc. Except for the case of the Orthodox Churches, the official and established religions have been progressively stripped of their persecutory and discriminatory elements. If it had not been the case, "establishment" would have been
abolished as being blatantly anti-democratic. The same argument can be made concerning the survival
of constitutional monarchies. See GUY HAARSCHER, LA LAICITt (4th ed. 2008).

2008]

RHETORIC AND ITS ABUSES

freedom of expression. I am only trying now to characterize the situation.
Obviously, it is because Muhammad is a sacred figure in Islam that the
cartoons were attacked, at least on two counts. First, they were representations of the Prophet, which, according to a dominant (but not the only)
tradition in Islam, is forbidden. Secondly, the content of the drawings was
blasphemous in that, for instance, one of the caricatures portrayed the
Prophet wearing a bomb on his head instead of a turban.
Now everybody is entitled to give whatever meaning he wants to a
drawing. A problem arises only when one considers that such an expression
constitutes as such an abuse of the right and should be suppressed. We can
limit ourselves to two different forms of suppression. The first one is legal
censorship, that is, suppression of the "speech" sensu lato and possible
punishment of the author inside the framework of the rule of law. The second one is to be situated outside the law: one tries to suppress the expression or to punish the author(s) by resorting to intimidation, threats, and
even outright violence. In this article, I am only interested in the first form
of suppression, that is, legal censorship. The question is thus the following:
"Is it justifiable under the rule of law to censor an expression because a part
of the population thinks it is blasphemous?" Let us, for the sake of argument, take the position of the advocates of censorship. Their case is of
course quite easy when they act in a country where an anti-blasphemy statute is in force: one has simply to apply the law.
But, rhetorically speaking, the situation is very different-and the case
becomes much harder-when there is no anti-blasphemy law on the books.
We already know that some European newspapers decided to republish the
drawings out of solidarity with the threatened journalists. All things considered, because there were attempts to suppress the cartoons in an illegal
and violent way, they wanted to show that they would defend freedom of
expression against intimidation and fanaticism. But here comes the legal
form of suppression. The French newspaper CharlieHebdo republished the
cartoons. 35 In response to this, the advocates of legal censorship brought a
suit against the newspaper, trying to suppress the drawings by legal
means. 3 6 But here is the difficulty: France does not have an anti-blasphemy

35. CHARLIE HEBDO (Paris), Feb. 8, 2006.
36. Philippe Val, director of Charlie Hebdo, was prosecuted at the request of some Muslim organizations before the Tribunal de Grande Instance (trial court) in Paris, for having republished the
cartoons. The trial took place on February 7 and 8, 2007. On March 22, 2007, Val was acquitted. See
Ariane Bernard, Trial Over Muhammad CartoonsBegins in France, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Feb. 8, 2007, at
A8; Craig S. Smith, French Court Rules for Newspaper That Printed Muhammad Cartoons, N.Y.
TIMES INT'L, Mar. 23, 2007, at A10.
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statute, so the case for censorship was much harder than it would have
been, say, in Austria or in Britain.
But the opponents of Charlie Hebdo succeeded in bringing the case
before a tribunal. In order to be entitled to proceed with their claim, they
first had to translate it into the language of French law. In other words, as
there was no statute providing for censorship of blasphemy, they had to
find another legal basis. If one looks at the arguments that were exchanged
in front of the judge and in the press, it is possible to distinguish between
two different rhetorical strategies of "translation." As I shall try to show,
both of them are in a sense "perverse," in that they transform the process of
argumentation into pure sophistry; in other words, they artificially create an
37
element of confusion.
The first strategy looks like this: one subtly transforms the conflict between a fundamental human right (freedom of expression) and the remnants of an official religion into a conflict between human rights. Instead,
therefore, of saying that the cartoons offend God, one affirms that they
insult the religious feelings of a (more or less) defined community. The
problem, then, is not that "God" is insulted (which was the original definition of blasphemy), but that certain individuals are (supposed to be) hurt in
their religious feelings, which prevents them from exercising their right to
freedom of religion. The translation works in the following way: the opposition between the individual and the order of God becomes a conflict between rights-between freedom of expression and freedom of religion.
Now these rights are on the same hierarchical level: there is no priority rule
(in the Rawlsian sense 38) which allows us to hold one of them superior over
the other. If they are of equal value, the only way of making a decision is to
"balance" them against each other. In other words, since freedom of expression and freedom of religion possess the same value, the judge will
have to assess whether or not one of the rights has been exercised in an
"exaggerated" way (an "abuse of right"), preventing other persons from
exercising the other right. There are many examples of such "systemic"
conflicts, that is, conflicts arising inside the system of human rights, and
not between a human right and some exterior norm. For instance, freedom
of expression must be balanced against the right of the suspect or the right
of the accused to a fair trial, so that the press must show some restraint; on
the other hand, the journalists must inform the public of cases that are im-

37. This is the "bad" sort of confusion I mentioned earlier, when I commented on Perelman's
definition of philosophy as "the systematic study of confused notions." De la Justice, supra note 27, at
17.
38. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 40-45 (1971).
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portant for the democratic life of the country. Freedom of expression must
also be balanced against the right to privacy or the rights in one's reputation (e.g., the law of defamation). These are well-known examples of systemic conflicts between human rights.
My point is that in the case of free speech and freedom of religion, the
systemic conflict is artificially constructed, and if one sees through it, it
appears particularly absurd. One would have to argue in such a context that
some drawings published in a Danish newspaper prevent Muslims anywhere in the world from exercising their right to freedom of religion; more
precisely, one would have to try to show that the republication of the cartoons in Charlie Hebdo would be, as such, an abuse of freedom of expression, one which violates the rights of French Muslims as far as the free
exercise of religion is concerned. If this were true (or even plausible), a
judge would necessarily have to balance one right against another, as there
exists no commonly accepted hierarchy between the two of them. Then we
would find ourselves in a situation similar to the ones I mentioned earlier:
free speech versus the right to a fair trial (or versus the right to privacy, or
right to reputation, etc.). This would then confer a strong legitimacy on the
limitations on free speech in the present case: not a censorship for religious-dogmatic reasons, not the crushing of human rights for the defense of
the remnants of an official religion, but a systemic conflict between human
rights-a conflict that would be deemed unavoidable in the absence of a
principled hierarchy. But the construction is wholly artificial. At the same
time, many people "buy" the argument. We must understand why.
Actually, an obvious reason for the existence of such a perverse process of translation is the following one. It is very difficult, in the context of
liberal democracy, to limit the scope of human rights in order to defend a
"superior" value. This is easily understandable, as human rights are considered, at least since the 1948 UN Universal Declaration, 3 9 the moral value
par excellence governing the political sphere. So the rhetorical strategy will
be much more efficient if the problem is transformed into a conflict between human rights of equivalent normative value. In the present case,
instead of speaking of a limitation on free speech for the sake of protecting
religion (or God) from being insulted, one does not "leave" the realm of
human rights: the limitation on one right is imposed in order to protect
another right. The rhetoric of the censor is transformed into an argument
about human rights. As I stated earlier, the fortress is occupied without

39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948).
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having to be stormed. But the result is exactly the same: free speech is limited.
Now one can ask whether or not such an argument can possibly convince legislators and judges. In Paris-at Philippe Val's (the editor of
CharlieHebdo) trial-it did not work, and the advocates of a strong protection of free speech won the case. 40 But we shall see that what I call the
rhetoric of translation (blasphemy becomes an attack on the "sensitivities"
of a community) has succeeded in other legal forums. Before analyzing this
problem, let us briefly summarize a second strategy that was also used at
the Paris trial.
The previous "translation" did not consist of abandoning the domain
of free speech and religion. The argument was only about a change of "victim": blasphemy meant that the target (the insulted "entity") was God;
"wounded religious sensitivities" signify that human beings are supposed to
be affected by the discourse. The difference is essential, in that, as it were,
the problem is "horizontalized": in the case of an explicit accusation of
blasphemy, the relationship is "vertical," so to speak, between a human
being who speaks (or writes, draws, etc.) and a supra-human entity. Of
course, as I said before, it is difficult to argue for such a limitation (censorship) in a liberal-democratic context. But the situation is at least intellectually clear, although it is not without danger for the speaker: an essential
human right is limited to protect religion and the sacred character of a divine being. When the ("perverse") translation process occurs, there is no
longer a limitation on a human right for the sake of preserving the "reputation" of God (or the Church), but a conflict of rights that has to be resolved
by finding a certain equilibrium. What is assumed here to be a zero-sum
game works in the following way: what free speech "wins" is "lost" by
freedom of religion (and the other way around). Under these conditions,
one must strike a balance for the sake of the "system" of human rights itself. The tension still exists between speech and religion, but the problem
has been reformulated in terms of liberties: one liberty pitted against another. So in a certain way the victim of censorship (from the point of view
of human rights) becomes the violator of the religious rights of the members of a community: he has abused his rights, "enough is enough,"-the
criticism is gratuitous, and does not contribute to a debate of general interest. The attack on the convictions of a community are thus unacceptable,
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Many public figures and politicians defended the
value of free speech in democracy in court. See PMtitions de Soutien d I'Hebdomadaire Satirique
"'CharlieHebdo ", LE MONDE, Feb. 7, 2007, at 13, available at 2007 WLNR 2270401; Stfphanie Le
Bars, Pour les Politiques, l'Objet "Islam" Est Devenu un Cr~neau, LE MONDE, Feb. 23, 2007, at 11,
availableat 2007 WLNR 3472429.
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but only because the exercise of the right to free speech has been abused.
There is-in appearance-no violation of a human right, but a legitimate
limitation on the exercise of a rightfor the sake of another right, that is, for
the sake of consistency within the system of rights.
Now the second strategy goes farther. It consists of abandoning, as it
were, the domain of religion and in reformulating the problem in "racial"
terms. We can summarize the argument as follows. If you attack the convictions of a group of people in a virulent way, it is because you do not
"like" them. You have fallen prey to a kind of irrational fear (phobia),
which might incite you to hatred or contempt. In brief, you are a racist.
This is, roughly speaking, the simplified meaning of-for instance"islamophobia." The republication of the cartoons by the French newspaper
is thus reinterpretedin non-religious terms: racism is not about ideas, it is
about a certain class of individuals who are deemed a priori inferior and
should not enjoy the same rights as others. Racism is of course a very dangerous phenomenon, and racist speech is despicable. Some European countries have anti-racist speech provisions on their books. 4 1 I do not want to
enter for the moment into the debate concerning the legitimacy of the
criminalization of racist discourse. But I want to emphasize the fact that
there is a fundamental difference between blasphemy and racist speech 42a difference which is precisely blurred by the recourse to a notion like
"islamophobia." Indeed, vigorous criticism of religion is about ideas, and
notably about the complex relationships between religion, politics, and
violence. The cartoons about Muhammad described the very dangerous
instrumentalization of Islam by terrorist groups. On the contrary, racism is
not about the ideas of the "other": when one refuses the equality of rights
to, for example, "colored people," it is not because of the ideas they have or
have not expressed. They are, so to speak, a priori excluded from the democratic forum, before they have had a chance to say anything. The prejudice plays a pre-eminent role here: the racist "knows" in advance that the
other is evil, ignorant, inferior, etc.
But if such a difference between criticism of ideas and criticism of
persons is quite easy to grasp in general terms, there are strong incentives
to deliberately blur the distinction. If you want to immunize a religion from
41. Racist speech enjoys protection in the United States. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 358 (2003). In many European countries, it is not protected. For instance, in the United Kingdom,
incitement to racial hatred is an offence under the Public Order Act 1986 with a maximum sentence of
up to seven years imprisonment. Public Order Act 1986, c. 64, § 27 (amended by the Racial and
Religious Hatred Act 2006, c. I, § 29L, sched.). In France, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, etc., "hate speech" is criminalized.
42. See Guy Haarscher, Tolerance of the Intolerant?, 10 RATIO JURIS 236 (1997).
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criticism, you have the option of interpreting the attack as being motivated
by hatred, irrational fear, and, to sum up the argument, racism. That argument pushes the translation process a little further: when blasphemy is
"translated" into an exaggerated attack on the feelings and sensitivities of a
(religious) group, the victim of the limitation of speech rights (here, the
journalist) is (illegitimately) placed on the same footing as the potential
"victim" of an attack on his or her religious convictions. The vertical relationship between the victim and the dogmatic oppressor is translated into a
horizontal relationship between two potential victims. The balance of interests then allows the judge to decide in favor of one of the two rights. But in
the case of a translation of the conflict into the language of racism, the
positions are radically inverted. Again, we have a vertical relationship between an oppressor and a victim-but this time, the victim of dogmatic
censorship (who is, so to speak, at the "bottom" of the relation) becomes
the oppressor (situated at the "top," because racism is a relationship of
domination). If such a rhetorical strategy succeeds, it will become more and
more difficult to criticize religion-a vital activity in a democratic society.
One must not underestimate the benefits of such an argumentative
strategy. Not only is the "wolf' in "sheepfold": in the case of an intrareligious translation, the wolf looks like another sheep. The censor is an
individual, deeply shocked in his convictions by a speech (or an image). In
the case of a translation into the language of racism, the wolf still resembles a sheep, but the "real" sheep takes the appearance of a wolf (a racist).
Albert Camus said in the beginning of 1'Homme Rgvolt that one of the
main (and terrifying) characteristics of the twentieth century was the inversion of the respective positions of the hangman and the victim:
But the slave camps under the banner of liberty, the massacres that are
justified by the love of man or a taste for super-humanity, in a sense,
make the judgment impotent. On the day when the crime wears the
clothes of innocence, it is innocence which is required to give its justifications, through
a curious process of inversion that is characteristic of
43
our times.

Here, we are confronted with the contemporary version of such a
strategy. The latter is no longer used in the context of the Cold War: it no
longer serves to place the Soviet totalitarian power in the position of the
"encircled" victim of international capitalism and imperialism; it is no

43. ALBERT CAMUS, L'HoMME REVOLTE 14 (1951) (author's translation). The original text reads:

Mais les camps d'esclaves sous labannire de lalibert6, lesmassacres justifids par l'amour de
l'homme ou le goait de lasurhumanit6, ddsemparent, en un sens, le jugement. Le jour oi le
crime se pare des ddpouilles de l'innocence, par un curieux renversement qui est propre A
notre temps, c'est l'innocence qui est sommre de foumir ses justifications.
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longer used to freeze political criticism of totalitarianism and the Gulag,
and to immunize Communism from rational assessment. According to Sar45
tre, anti-Communists were "dogs," 44 they tried to reduce "Billancourt" to
despair, that is, they crushed the hope of Western workers in a better world;
they reinforced the status quo and the continued domination of the bourgeoisie. Criticizing Communism meant that one was motivated by hidden
and shameful interests in the preservation of an unjust order based, as Marx
wrote in Das Kapital, on exploitation. 46 Today, the very fact of criticizing,
say, Islam (or even only the terrorist instrumentalization of Islam), is often
supposed to mean that one is motivated by "hatred," "phobia," and "racism," to the detriment of an unjustly attacked "community."
But if there are lessons to be learned from the stigmatization of antiCommunists at the time of the Cold War,4 7 they are essentially the following: contrary to what the Communists said, one could plausibly criticize the
Soviet Union from the point of view of human rights and democracy regardless of one's political positions in the domain of social redistribution
and equality. By the same token, one can reasonably criticize Islam, and be
a loyal Muslim; of course, one can also criticize Islam, or even all religions, from an atheist position, provided that it does not amount to a defense
of official atheism, that is, the forced eradication of the "opium of the people," as the young Marx defined religion. 48 More fundamentally, criticizing
religion (or political religion, or a particular religion) is completely different from wanting to discriminate against a group that is defined by "racial"
traits. Of course, the devil is always in the details, and racists have learned
44. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, Merleau-Ponty,in SITUATIONS IV 248-49 (1964) ("[U]n anticommuniste
est un chien"!).
45. The Seguin island in Paris was famous for the Billancourt Renault factory that was built on it.
It is a place where many workers' revolts took place. It does not exist anymore. See JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE, NEKRASSOV (1956).
46. The exploitation of the labor force and the extraction of "surplusvalue" are exposed in Chapters VII-XI of Das Kapital. See I KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ben
Fowkes trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1867).
47. Of course, Communists were also stigmatized in the West. For a balanced approach of
McCarthyism, taking into account the discovery of, notably, the "Venona documents," see MARTIN H.
REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA (2005).
48. Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der Hegel'schen Rechts-Philosophie [Contribution to the Critique of
Hegel's Philosophy of Right], in DEUTSCH-FRANZOSISCHE JAHRBOCHER 71-72 (1844) ("Religion is the
general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point
d'honneur, it enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has
not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against
that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed
creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people."); see GUY HAARSCHER, L'ONTOLOGIE DE MARX: LE PROBLtME DE L'ACTION, DES TEXTES DE
JEUNESSE A L'OEUVRE DE MATURITE (1980).
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to adapt their rhetorical strategies to a changing world which becomes49
happily-more and more hostile to open racism.
But let us now consider the actual decision of the French tribunal in
the case of the Danish cartoons (more exactly, their reproduction by Charlie Hebdo). So far, I have only mentioned the argumentative strategies of
the advocates of a politically correct censorship, that is, a censorship which
is not named as such but is translated into either the language of shocked
religious sensitivities or the language of racism. Philippe Val, the editor of
the newspaper, was acquitted by the Paris tribunal, 50 so the arguments
summarized above did not prevail. This does not deprive them from their
appeal to many people acting in good faith. As far as the defense of Charlie
Hebdo was concerned, the emphasis was put on the importance of free
speech for a democratic society. 5 1 Many personalities (from the left and
from the right) testified in favor of the accused. 52 If certain limits must be
assigned to the exercise of the right, they should not prevent the press and
individuals from defending opinions that are considered shocking by a part
of the population. Afortiori, according to these witnesses, the free criticism
of ideas, even in the form of caricatures (that by themselves imply exaggerations) should be guaranteed to avoid a "chilling" effect on the debate.
Indeed, the argument goes, if one must take into consideration the sensitivities of the many groups which coexist in a pluralist society, nobody will
feel safe when expressing an idea. We shall be confronted with the opposite
danger: people will not speak "enough." The accent put unilaterally on the
peril of exaggeration leads to a reinforcement of political correctness, conformism, and finally, hypocrisy. John Locke previously affirmed, in one of
his arguments against the use of force to impose a religious orthodoxy, that
such a constraint would induce an individual to adhere to a faith for the
wrong reasons-not because he was convinced by the basic tenets of the
relevant religious doctrine, or because he "had the faith," but for prudential

49. Such as is illustrated by, for example, the New Right. The major reference on the subject is
PIERRE-ANDRE TAGUIEFF, SUR LA NOUVELLE DROITE: JALONS D'UNE ANALYSE CRITIQUE (1994). On
Holocaust denial, see PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, LES ASSASSINS DE LA MtMOIRE (1987). The New Right
is discussed in greater detail infra Part VI.
50. Tribunal de grande instance [T.GJ.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 17e ch.,
Mar. 22, 2007, JCP 2007, No. 19-10079, note Derieux (case against Philippe Val, editor of Charlie
Hebdo).
51. See sources cited supra note 40.
52. Politicians Frangois Bayrou (President of the centrist Party UDF), Frangois Hollande (Secretary-General of the Socialist Party) and Nicolas Sarkozy (the then President of the UMP, the Gaullist
Party) came to defend Val and the value of free speech in a democratic society. See Le Bars, supra note
40.
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reasons: to avoid persecution or to obtain an advantage reserved to the
53
privileged who profess the official creed.
IV.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND "TRANSLATION"

These are well-known arguments, and one might think that, in a contemporary liberal democracy, they would be sufficiently convincing for the
case to be easily won. This is what happened, but one would be naive to
think that the defeated opinion (the "translated" thesis of the accusation)
does not have the power to persuade many individuals-even non-religious
or "tolerant" people (the ambiguity of the notion of "tolerance" is well
documented, particularly when it is used as a Trojan horse in the process of
perverse translation). 54 In order to make my point, I would like to briefly
summarize recent developments in the case law of two high courts in the
contemporary democratic world: the United States Supreme Court and the
European Court of Human Rights.
The leading decision in the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court is Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson (1952).55 A film by the famous Italian movie director Roberto Rossellini, The Miracle, was censored by the New York
authorities. The central character of the film was a young peasant girl. The
53. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1
(1952).
For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and
power of true religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not
faith without believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true and the other well
pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the
exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to
be displeasing unto Him, we add unto the number of our other sins those also of hypocrisy
and contempt of His Divine Majesty.
Id. at3.
54. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 61-62
(1995) (Palm, Pekkanen, & Makarczyk, JJ., dissenting) ("Nevertheless, it must be accepted that it may
be 'legitimate' ... to protect the religiousfeelings of certain members of society against criticism and
abuse to some extent; tolerance works both ways and the democratic character of a society will be
affected if violent and abusive attacks on the reputation of a religious group are allowed. Consequently,
it must also be accepted that it may be 'necessary in a democratic society' to set limits to the public
expression of such criticism or abuse. To this extent, but no further, we can agree with the majority.")
(emphasis added). The "clear" idea of tolerance is that the shocked person should respect the dissenter
as long as he does not use violent means. The "confused" idea means that the "dissenter" should respect
the "reputation" of a religious group, and that "religious feelings" should be "protect[ed]." This is very
ambiguous and problematic. Concerning group libel, see Guy Haarscher, Diffamation Collective: Une
Notion Irrm6diablement Confuse? (Centre Perelman de Philosophie du Droit, Universit6 Libre de
Bruxelles, Working Paper No. 2007/7, 2007), available at http://www.philodroit.be/IMG/pdf/WP-GHDiffamationcollective.pdf.
55. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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movie suggested that she was raped by an individual she thought was Joseph, her favorite saint. The girl was expelled from the village when it was
discovered that she was pregnant while still unmarried. Finally, she delivered the child in a church. The details of the case are not relevant here: we
are only looking at the way the Court argues concerning an expression that
was clearly considered blasphemy (or a sacrilegious act). The Justices denied the constitutionality of censorship. 56 Their argument ran as follows:
In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of "sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a
boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views,
with no charts but those provided by the most vocal andpowerful ortho-

doxies.... Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor
would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the exApplication of the "sacrilegious"
pression of unpopular sentiments ....
test... might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's
guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all.
However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is
enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
any or all religionsfrom views distasteful to them which is sufficient to

justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the
business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined atwhether they appear in publitacks upon a particular religious doctrine,
57
cations, speeches, or motion pictures.
This is a principled position, which consists of comparing the situation
of the judge (here, the Justices) to that of a sailor who is attracted by various currents. He has no chart to help him choose a direction, and he is finally carried away by the most powerful current. Of course, the notion is
used here metaphorically: if the judge decided to censor an expression because it was considered sacrilegious or blasphemous by a religious "current," he would be dominated by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies.
It is not the business of the State to suppress opinions that a religious group
finds "distasteful." If we perform a thought experiment and imagine in a
counterfactual way that the Justices of the United States have to decide the
CharlieHebdo case, we can be sure that Philippe Val will be acquitted (as
it actually happened in Paris): the position of the Court is stated without
conditions. 58 The Court seems to be absolutely against censorship in matters of so-called blasphemy. We should notice that the Justices do not even

56. Id. at 506.
57. Id. at 504-05 (emphasis added).
58. "[W]ithout any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases."' Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275
(1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (conceming "collective defamation"). This case was decided the same
year as Burstyn.
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mention the possibility of translating the position of Cardinal Spellman
(who acted as spokesman of one of the "most powerful orthodoxies"-and
was indeed very "vocal") into the language of human rights. The Cardinal
himself did speak in a straightforward way. 59 The opposition is clear-cut:
on the one side are the religious currents that want to suppress opinions
60
they find "repugnant"; on the other side, the advocates of free speech.
Let us now present, in a very summarized way, the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights concerning the same problem. One must
first note that a dictum of the European Court, in a famous 1976 case
(Handyside v. United Kingdom6 1), seems to go in the same direction as the
Burstyn case. The judges say the following:
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a
democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for
the development of every man. Subject to Article 10,62it is applicable
not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that
offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance6 3 and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society".

The position in 1976 seems clear: offending, shocking, or disturbing
speech is protected by the Convention. The European Court began to deal
with blasphemy cases in the 1990s, first in a very controversial and much

59. "On Sunday, January 7, 1951, a statement of His Eminence, Francis Cardinal Spellman,
condemning the picture and calling on 'all right thinking citizens' to unite to tighten censorship laws,
was read at all masses in St. Patrick's Cathedral." Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 513 (Frankfurther, J., concurring).
60. Many U.S. Supreme Court decisions confirmed such a view. For instance:
There is no doubt that the caricature of respondent and his mother published in Hustler is at
best a distant cousin of the political cartoons described above, and a rather poor relation at
that. If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the
other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any
such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description "outrageous" does not
supply one. "Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors'
tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be
awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
61. 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1976).
62. Article 10 stipulates that some precise and restricted limitations to the exercise of free speech
are legitimate under the Convention. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, § 2 (as amended by Protocol 11, which entered into force on Nov. 1,
1998) [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human Rights], available at http://www.echr.coe.
int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/Basic+Texts/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights+and+
its+Protocols/.
63. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23.
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commented decision: Otto-PremingerInstitute v. Austria (1994).64 The aim
of the Otto-Preminger Institute was to show art films that could not be seen
in big theaters. As in the Burstyn case, a movie was considered "blasphemous." A Council in the Heavens, directed by Werner Schr6ter, told the
story of Oskar Panizza, who had been convicted in 1894 by the Munich
assizes court for blasphemy after writing a play in which God was portrayed as an impotent senile individual, Mary as a whore who kissed the
devil, and Jesus as a mentally retarded youngster. A council decided to
spread syphilis in order to punish humanity for its sins. The Otto-Preminger
Institute decided to show the movie in Innsbruck. An anti-blasphemy
criminal statute was in force in Austria, and at the request of the diocese,
the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the director of
the Institute, under the Austrian criminal statute, for blasphemy (the exact
charge was "disparaging religious doctrines"). Otto-Preminger was convicted under that statute, the movie clearly being blasphemous. 65 Just as it
was the case in Burstyn (which, in a manner of speaking, took the opposite
approach), the situation was clear: on the one side were the Catholic bishops (the dominant religious "current" in Austria), who wanted to enforce an
anti-blasphemy statute; on the other side was the Otto-Preminger Institute,
which had decided to show a movie on Panizza on censorship and the relationships between speech, art, and religion.
But when the case was brought by the association before the European
Commission of Human Rights (at that time the "antechamber" to the European Court6 6 ), the lawyers of Otto-Preminger were confident that they
would win in Strasbourg. Why? Because the legal basis of the decision was
fundamentally different. Indeed, in Austria, the judges had to apply a clear
valid statute criminalizing blasphemy. In Strasbourg, judges must apply the
European Convention on Human Rights, which, of course, does not contain
a provision against blasphemy, but on the contrary guarantees, in its Article
10, the right to freedom of expression. 67 Moreover, as I already said, the
1976 Handyside decision had created a liberal jurisprudence that made the
advocates of Otto-Preminger very optimistic: speech "that offend[s],

64. App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1995).
65. Id. at 37-41.
66. The Commission was abolished by Protocol 11 to the Convention. The Protocol entered into
force in 1998. See Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 124 (1999).
67. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supranote 62, art. 10, § 1 ("Everyone has the
.right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.").
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shock[s] or disturb[s] the State or any sector of the population" 68 was supposed to be protected. But freedom of expression is not an absolute right
under the Convention, and paragraph 2 of Article 10 provides some limitations on the right. 69 But again, blasphemy-or an offense to religion-is
not one of the legitimate bases for limitation that are listed in that paragraph. So how did Austria's lawyers argue? In a very simple way: they
translated the conflict (we already know how such a rhetorical strategy
works) between the Otto-Preminger Institute and the State of Austria into a
"systemic" conflict between rights. One of the legitimate aims in the name
of which freedom of expression can be limited under the Convention (Article 10, paragraph 2) is to protect "the rights of others."'70 Such is the case
when a conflict between rights of equal "value" occurs-but a conflict
between which rights? Between, according to the majority of the sitting
judges, freedom of expression (Article 10) and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9). The Strasbourg Court held that Austria
had not violated Article 10 of the Convention, but, on the contrary, had
legitimately limited the right to free speech to protect the (religious) rights
of the others.
But what are these "rights," and who are the "others"? We must first
emphasize a similarity between the respective situations in Innsbruck
(which occurred at the end of the 1980s) and Copenhagen (in 2004): in
each case, the relevant "community" did not express itself on that matter,
but some very orthodox and vocal leaders spoke and acted-the bishops in
Austria, as well as some radical Muslim leaders in Denmark (and elsewhere, which is unavoidable in a world of global communication). Of
course, I only want here to stress a structural similarity between both situations: the attitude of the bishops is not comparable to that which took place
a couple of years ago in the Muslim world (especially the violence that
erupted in some parts of the Middle East). The only common element is
related to the problem of representation:the "people" did not complain or
initiate the process. In a later decision concerning a rather similar case, a
dissenting judge noticed that "[t]he actual opinion of believers remains

68. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23.
69. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 62, art. 10, § 2 ("The exercise of
these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.").
70. Id.
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unknown." 7 1 Under such conditions, the translation of a blasphemy case
into a systemic conflict of human rights becomes very problematic indeed:
it would be difficult to affirm in good faith that the right of the Catholics to
freely practice their religion was violated by the exercise of the right to free
speech by the Otto-Preminger Institute. Actually, the movie was shown
after 10 PM during the week, in a small theater, and it was forbidden to
children and teenagers under seventeen. The advertisement had been very
cautious, so it seems obvious that Catholics were not prevented from living
according to their spiritual orientations just because a movie they were not
obliged to see was shown in a theater. The fact is that the translation was so
far-fetched that the decision aroused a virulent controversy. One can understand the situation in which Austria's attorneys found themselves and the
necessity for them to find legal arguments to support their case. What is not
easily understandable is the fact that a majority of the judges sitting on the
Court "bought" the argument and found that Austria had not violated the
Convention.
So we can see that mavericks, bigots, or naive leftist militants do not
have a monopoly on problematic "translation." Eminent members of the
legal elite have accepted the validity of the-very controversialreformulated argument. And there is more to the predicament: OttoPremingerInstitute v. Austria was not an isolated decision. The European
72
Court has continued to uphold its jurisprudence through the present day.
But the problem is more complex than it appears to be at first glance. If we
compare the 1994 decision by the Strasbourg Court to the 1952 U.S.
Burstyn case, we are tempted to make a clear-cut distinction. The Justices
of the United States did not translate blasphemy into the language of human rights. They described the problem in plain terms: some religious
groups (here, the Catholics) did not want some sacred figures to be
mocked, or even-as it took place in The Miracle,73 which is not at all a
"caricature"-presented in a shocking or offending way. The distributor of
the movie invoked his First Amendment right to free speech. The Court did
not translate the problem into a "systemic" conflict between rights, but
presented it in clear language and reversed the decision of the lower court.
In brief, the Supreme Court took the side of free speech. Atfirst glance, the
European Court did exactly the contrary in the 1994 case. It "reconfigured"

71. See Wingrove v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 38 (1995) (L6hmus, J., dissenting).
72. See I.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2007); Tatlav v. Turkey, App.
No. 50692/99 (2006), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.
73. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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the conflict in terms of a systemic tension and decided in favor of Austria.
But if this were totally true (it is at least partially valid), the European
Court would have had to clearly say that the Handyside jurisprudence was
no longer good law. But the Court, thus far, has always affirmed the compatibility between Handyside and Otto-Preminger.74 How can we understand this, keeping in mind that A Council in the Heavens was obviously
"offending, shocking or disturbing"? Did not the 1976 decision say without
ambiguity that this was protectedspeech?
Actually, since 1994, the European Court has made a subtle distinction between two types of expression: one of them is protected, the other is
not. Shocking speech is still protected, except if it is gratuitously offensive,
that is, if it does not contribute to a debate of general interest. In other
words, the shocking character of the speech must be redeemed by a certain
social value. The provocation should not be unnecessary or gratuitous.
(One partially similar argument was used by the United States Supreme
Court, but it concerned obscenity, which is a very different matter.) 75 But
in the nineteenth century, Baudelaire and Flaubert were prosecuted in
France, because describing lesbianism (in Les Fleurs du Mal) or adultery
(in Madame Bovary) was considered a gratuitous provocation that did not
nourish in any sense the public debate. 76 Everybody knows that these two
books are major works of universal literature.
Let us summarize the argument. The U.S. Supreme Court does not
translate blasphemy into the language of human rights. It does not make the
"wolf' look like a "sheep." It does not build a Trojan horse. It defends free
speech against the dogmatic claims of the religious "currents." The 1952
decision is still good law.7 7 The European Court of Human Rights does
make the translation. Blasphemy is reformulated as the right of individuals
not to be "gratuitously" offended in their convictions or sensitivities, without-so the judges say-any benefit in terms of public interest and debate.
Thus, there is an inevitable process of balancing between two rights and
two competing claims, both invoking the Convention: the first, Article 10,
the other, Article 9. In some cases free speech prevails, because the Court
considers the expression shocking or offensive, but at the same time finds

74.
75.
76.
morals"
charges,
77.

See sources cited supra notes 71-72.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
On August 21, 1857, Baudelaire was convicted by a French tribunal for "insult to public
(outrage 6 la morale publique). The same year, Flaubert was prosecuted under the same
and finally acquitted.
Although some U.S. states still have blasphemy laws on the books from the founding days.
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that it serves the democratic debate and is thus not "insulting. '7 8 In other
cases, the Court finds in favor of what it calls freedom of religion, and
decides that the State has not violated the Convention. 79 But this is heavily
problematic, as nobody can seriously confirm that freedom of religion is
hindered by the fact that a movie, a theater play, or a cartoon in a newspaper-which nobody is obliged to see-expresses ideas that are repugnant to
members of some communities. We are not at all in the condition of being
a "captive audience." So, obviously, this is an artificial construction, a bogus systemic conflict, which should never have been endorsed by the
Strasbourg judges.

V.

THE ASCENT OF THE "PSEUDO-ARGUMENT"

In the Trait de l'Argumentation, Perelman defines the "pseudoargument" as follows. "It is actually possible that one seeks to obtain approval while basing the argument on premises that one does not accept
oneself as valid. This does not imply hypocrisy, since we can be convinced
by arguments other than the ones used to convince the persons we are talking to."'80 I am not interested here in the possible absence of "hypocrisy," as
for instance when the speaker uses a path of reasoning that is different from
the one he used to convince himself (because the latter would not be understood in a specific context by a particular audience). As we saw before, it
happens often, especially today, that the speakerpretends to begin with the
same premises as those accepted by his audience, because it helps him
penetrate the fortress. In the examples I gave before in relation to limitations on free speech, the censor pretended to begin with human rights
premises: "the rights of others." He then constructed an artificial and noncredible systemic conflict between religious liberty and freedom of expression. In certain instances, he was even able to completely invert the respective positions of the "hangman" and the "victim" by accusing the one who
exercised his right to free speech of being a racist (who was guilty, for
instance, of "islamophobia" 81). The European judges never went that far,
but, as I tried to show, they accepted in certain circumstances the legitimacy of the translation from blasphemy into the language of the "rights of

78. See Tatlav v. Turkey, App. No. 50692/99 (2006), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp
197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.
79. See I.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 42571/98,45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2007).
80. CHAiM PERELMAN, RHtTORIQUES 80 (1989).
81. For a critique of the confusing notion of "islamophobia," see, for instance, Writers' Statement
on Cartoons, BBC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4764730.stm (signed by
various writers, including Salman Rushdie).

2008]

RHETORIC AND ITS ABUSES

others." Now this is precisely, in my opinion, an example of the use of the
"pseudo-argument" in the Perelmanian sense. The sophist uses it in a
"hypocritical" way in a deliberate attempt to confuse the audience and introduce "the wolf in sheep's clothing." The European judges, who of
course act in good faith, fall prey to a "paralogism," that is, an involuntary
error of judgment or an involuntarily false inference. In both cases, the real
controversy is obscured, as the opponent (the censor) hides his own premises and pretends to adopt the ones of the other (the liberal democratic values). It is precisely at this moment that we should listen to Vico and
Perelman's advice. One needs a very good training in argumentation and a
knowledge of the art of topics to be able to distinguish between real systemic conflicts (conflicts of rights) and bogus ones. Such training is necessary to discriminate between interlocutors that actually accept the basic
premises of liberal democracy, and interlocutors who just exploit the naYvet6 of contemporary audiences in order to promote their illiberal aims
under the guise of ...liberalism. Socrates was unjustly accused (first by
Aristophanes, 82 and twenty years later by Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon at
his trial 83) of corrupting the youth by making the weaker cause the
stronger. Actually, the attack was aimed at the sophists, whom Socrates had
virulently criticised. The comparison drawn by the accusers (and before, by
Aristophanes) between Socrates and the sophists was unfounded. But as far
as sophists and demagogues were concerned, the critique was perfectly
apposite: as they used rhetoric in a very skillful and cunning way, they
were able to pretend that they adopted the same premises as the audience,
and then to draw from them pseudo-conclusions by carefully hiding the
deliberately mistaken inferences and the poorly established facts. The
weakness of the cause was not visible as such-it looked stronger. By the
same token, the "translation" of blasphemy into the rights of the others isas I hope to have shown-very inadequate, but for an audience that is not
educated in the art of sound argumentation, the weakness is not visible.
Such a perverse use of the pseudo-argument is not limited to the realm
of free speech. Actually, it is very pervasive. As I previously noted when
discussing Vico's address, there is always a danger in the realm of nonformal argumentation, namely, that the courtier replaces the intellectual.
Basically, what does the courtisan do? He flatters the powerful (the king in
monarchies, the "few" in aristocracies and oligarchies, and the "many" in

82. See Aristophanes, The Clouds, in FIFTEEN GREEK PLAYS 545-602 (Gilbert Murray et al.,
trans., 1943).
83. PLATO, The Apology, in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS 61 (Harold

North Fowler trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1914).
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democracies). One of the most efficient kinds of flattery consists of making
the other believe that he is right, that you agree with his basic principles,
that you adopt the same premises, that you are "like" him-in brief, that no
meaningful difference exists between the two of you. Then, when the audience is lulled into complacency, you draw some conclusions from the
premises using distorted arguments. The weakness of the latter is not visible, as the sophist, the courtier, or the flatterer is very apt at subtly distorting the reasoning leading to a result he actually wanted prior to entering the
discussion.
If we want to put the problem in a historical perspective, we can say
that it is almost always the case that, as the advocates of a position become
weakened, they choose less aggressive strategies. A couple of centuries
ago, the Church had no difficulty imposing a respect for God and the sacred symbols or figures on all potential dissidents or unbelievers. But increasingly, the ascent of democratic values and secularism made it more
and more difficult to adopt such a radically intolerant position. So the religious authorities often used another strategy: they pretended to accept human rights and the separation of Church and State. Of course, all "retreats"
are not strategic. The "conversion" to human rights and the values of liberal
democracy can be sincere. But herein lies the problem: if an individual is
not educated in the theory and the art of argumentation, it will be impossible for him to distinguish between an authentic inner transformation and
"hypocrisy. ' 84 One might suggest that making such a distinction requires a
knowledge of the underlying motivations, which would make the whole
enterprise very problematic. But I do not think that we necessarily have to
sound out the hearts and fathom the intentions. Take our example of the
pseudo "systemic" conflict in the abovementioned cases concerning blasphemy. It is enough here, at least in order to develop the critical sense, to
point out that the so-called equivalence between "sensitivities" and freedom of religion is, particularly in such a context, unfounded. But if such an
equivalence is nevertheless often made and the same "arguments" repeated
time and again, we will be in the presence of a pattern. This is what I would
like to show in the conclusion of this article: the "translation" defined
above is pervasive; it is partly the expression of a deliberate strategy dedicated to confusing the minds and weakening the "real" defense of human
rights; it is also partly related to the air du temps, to the intellectual atmosphere of political correctness and the ignorance of the public (and the elite)

84. See Perelman, supra note 80, for Perelman's use of the notion of "hypocrisy" in the analysis
of the "pseudo-argument."
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concerning the weakness of the arguments made in favor of a censorship
supposedly exercised in the name of human rights themselves.
I mentioned earlier Camus' statement to the effect that the respective
positions of the "victim" and the "hangman" had been inverted in the twentieth century. 85 Actually, the French philosopher had in mind the idea of
"progressive" violence that was often used in the revolutionary rhetoric, at
least from 1789 on. The idea was that the arbitrary use of the guillotine
during the French Terreur of 1793-94, or the existence of the Gulag in the
Soviet Union, were unfortunately necessary to struggle against the enemy,
the exploiter, be it the Ancien Rgime or capitalist imperialism. If you resisted such a trend in the name of human rights, you were inevitably considered a reactionary: your "sentimental" arguments slowed the pace of
history and made universal emancipation a more remote ideal. Conversely,
the revolutionary who decided to "make his hands dirty" 86 was a progressive. The revolutionary murderer was considered to be the defender of the
innocents, and the advocate of the victim was... the hangman of humanity. I do not pretend that such an argument is never valid: in some very
limited cases, violence can be labeled a lesser evil.87 But likely in the majority of the cases, the argument is nothing more than an excuse, an "alibi":
it helps transform the oppressor into the advocate of the victims. This is
exactly what took place in the blasphemy cases I analyzed earlier, and it
very clearly shows that what Camus said was not only valid for the twentieth century (revolutionary radicalism, Cold War, etc.), but also for the
twenty-first century (struggle against secularism and all "godless Constitutions" 8 8). To return briefly to the topic of Soviet Communism, let me mention the Constitutions that were adopted under, respectively, Stalin and
Brezhnev: apparently, they guaranteed some first generation rights such as
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association.
But at the same time the two Constitutions stipulated that the rights had to
be exercised in support of the Communist Party and the "people" it was
supposed to represent 89-the rights had to be exercised in favor of the gov85. See CAMUS, supra note 43, at 14.
86. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, Les Mains Sales [Dirty Hands], in NO EXIT AND THREE OTHER
PLAYS 125 (Vintage Int'l Edition 1989) (1946).
87. In The Lesser Evil, Michael Ignatieff provides a good analysis of the conditions necessary for
the use of the argument of the lesser evil to be legitimate. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL:
POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 25-53 (2004).
88. See generally ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A
MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE (2005).
89. Konstitutsiia SSSR (1936) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 125 ("In conformity with

the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the
U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law: freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of assembly, includ-

ing the holding of mass meetings; freedom of street processions and demonstrations.") (emphasis
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eminent. This is contrary to what these rights mean, namely, the protection
of dissident voices in democratic societies. Thus, both Constitutions grant
the rights with one hand, and withdraw them with the other. Dictatorship
(that is, where every act and speech must have the approval of the government) is translated into human rights (which are "guaranteed" in the text).
At least we can say that the translation is quite visible: the human rights
"garment" is threadbare.
VI. CREATIONISM, HOLOCAUST DENIAL, AND "TRANSLATION"

In conclusion, let us rapidly give some contemporary examples of the
process of perverse translation. As I said before, the advocates of a religious polity can defend the latter by a frontal attack or by introducing the
wolf in sheep's clothing (or the Trojan horse into the "fortress" of human
rights). Very often, both strategies are used at different moments. In the
classical situation, the frontal attack is chosen when the advocates of a
theologico-political State are powerful; when they are no longer in a position to impose their views, they change their strategy and use the "translation" device. This is particularly visible in the debate between the
Creationists and the advocates of"Darwinian" science.
Darwin decided to publish The Origins of Species in 1859 after waiting for almost twenty years, because he feared "the firestorm of anger that
his ideas were sure to unleash." 90 The idea of natural selection ran counter
to some basic elements of the Christian faith: human beings were no longer
distinguished (as created in the "image of God" and possessing a soul)
from animals; on the contrary, a continuity was established between the
latter and the former through the process of evolution; evolution itself
worked through the mechanism of natural selection, which was brutal and
at odds with Christian values (notably, charity). To make a long story short,
in the United States, the conflict became acute after the First World War.
Before that, there were too few students in secondary school, and the teaching of science was rudimentary. But in the beginning of the 1920s, with
"the growth of secondary education .... more students were being exposed
to evolution." 9 1 At that time, the conflict was clear, and no "translation"

added); Konst. SSSR (1977) art. 39, § 2 ("Enjoyment by citizens of their rights and freedoms must not
be to the detriment of the interests of society or the state, or infringe the rights of other citizens.")
(emphasis added); Konst. SSSR (1977) art. 62, § 1 ("Citizens of the USSR are obliged to safeguardthe
interests of the Soviet state, and to enhance its power andprestige.") (emphasis added).
90. Niles Eldredge, Foreword to EUGENIE C. SCOTT, EVOLUTION VS. CREATIONISM:
INTRODUCTION, at x (2004).

91. SCOTT, supra note 90, at 91.
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was necessary. The State of Tennessee had passed a statute stipulating that
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any teacher to teach any theory that denies the
Story of Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead
that man has descended from a lower order of animal." 92 In 1925, the famous Scopes trial-the "Monkey Trial"-took place. Scopes had taught
Darwinism in class and was finally convicted in Dayton for having violated
the Butler Act. During the trial, former presidential candidate William
Jennings Bryan exchanged arguments with Clarence Darrow, Scopes's
attorney and a well-known atheist. "The antievolution laws remained on the
books, and even increased in numbers." 93 But beginning in the 1960s, after
the Soviets had succeeded in launching the Sputnik, the science curriculum
in secondary school was considerably strengthened, including the teaching
of biology. Creationists tried to suppress that teaching. They lost before the
Supreme Court. 94 The Justices considered the prohibition against teaching
Darwinism in public schools in the name of Creation theory to amount to
an establishment of religion. So the Creationists adopted a different strategy. The "translation" process had begun. They required "equal time and
emphasis" or "balanced treatment" 95 for both Creationism and Darwinism.
This means that Creationists no longer wanted (because at that time they
did not have the power to do so) to suppress the teaching of "Darwinian"
doctrines (that is, science); instead, they invoked liberal-democratic values,
that is, equality and pluralism. The Court struck down a Louisiana statute
providing for equal time and emphasis. 96 The reasoning was that putting a
scientific theory and a religious doctrine on the same level amounted to an
establishment of religion, and therefore was contrary to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 9 7 Then the advocates of Creationism
changed their strategy again, and went further in the process of "translaAlthough textbooks at the tum of the century included evolution, few students were exposed
to the evolution contained in these books: in the late nineteenth century, high school education was largely limited to urban dwellers and the elite .... But high school enrollment approximately doubled during each subsequent decade, so that by 1920, there were almost 2
million students attending high school.
Id.
92. Id. at 93 (quoting Tennessee's Butler Act of 1925).
93. Id. at 97.
94. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968).
95. E.g., 1981 Ark. Acts 1231.
96. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482,U.S. 578 (1987); see also McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255, 1258-64 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
97. U.S. CONST. amend 1: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The
process of adoption via ratification by the requisite number of states was completed on December 15,
1791.
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tion." They tried to introduce Intelligent Design (ID) into schools. That
doctrine is supposed to be based on purely scientific arguments. ID theorists believe that the complexity of life and living organisms is not understandable without the presupposition of a "Designer." Religion as such is
no longer invoked, because they want to avoid the establishment objection.
ID advocates reformulate the argument based on equality and pluralism:
this time, the translation of the tension between free scientific inquiry and
religious dogmatism seems to be perfect, as the opposition is considered to
be a "systemic" conflict between two scientific conceptions of life.
It is worth while remembering that the same strategy had been used in
blasphemy cases in Europe. A conflict between liberal-democratic values
and theologico-political claims had been translated into a conflict taking
place inside the democratic and secular sphere, that is, a perfectly normal
scientific controversy. In 2004, in Pennsylvania, the Dover Board of
Education decided that at the beginning of biology courses, a short statement should be read to the students letting them know that there existed
98
another acceptable scientific conception of life, that is, Intelligent Design.
A federal judge, after long debate (notably involving questions related to
the definition of science), finally decided that introducing ID into public
schools-even under the very "modest" form of a preliminary statementwas, again, an establishment of religion. 99 Thus, for the time being, the
strategy adopted by the opponents of scientific biology (Darwinism) is
completely different from the one that they used, say, in the 1920s. One no
longer speaks of censorship, or even of equal time and emphasis for Darwinism and Creationism. Balanced treatment between Darwinism and ID is
not even required any more: ID advocates "just" wanted a short statement
to be read to the students at the beginning of the first class. Even such a
modest demand was rejected by a federal judge as amounting to an establishment of religion. The controversy is far from over, but it shows very
well how the strategy of translation actually works. Incidentally, it also
shows that the federal courts do not seem ready to accept the arguments
flowing from such a strategy.
Finally, another domain where "translation" is very present is racism.
Today, racists are deprived of legitimacy in the democratic debate. Again,
"in the beginning," the problem was clearly enunciated. Racism is the exact
opposite of human rights: the latter presuppose universalism (the human
being as such is the repository of certain basic rights grounded in the equal
dignity of all individuals). Racism is totally different from such a concep98. For a good explanation of Intelligent Design, see SCOTT,supra note 90, at 113-31.
99. Kitzniller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 765-66 (2005).
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tion: it fragments humanity into two (or several) parts, and it interprets such
a particularization in a biological and hierarchical sense. Nineteenth century racism, when it began to be systematized, ran counter to our modem
universalistic moral intuitions. In its most brutal form, racism is as old as
humanity: a group spontaneously tends to underrate the "other" and stigmatize the "alien" by affirming the latter's inferiority. The opposition is
clear--on the one hand, we have a particularistic, communitarian, and hierarchical conception of humanity, and on the other hand we have a universalistic, individualist, and egalitarian view.
In the nineteenth century, however, racism as an explicit ideology developed on the basis of illegitimate extrapolations from philology and biology, that is, from "science." 10 0 Indeed, as we have seen, racism was
opposed to the moral values underpinning liberal democracy and constitutionalism. But the new claim was that it was grounded in scientific inquiry,
an activity also intimately linked to modem values. Now scientific activity
"disenchants" the world: science is the opposite of wishful thinking, and its
results can frustrate our most cherished expectations. Thus, the theoreticians of nineteenth century racism could begin to translate the conflict between human rights values and brute racial prejudice into a kind of
"systemic" conflict between two modem values: universal human dignity
and the "scientific" theory of racial superiority. After 1945, the process of
translation was considerably radicalized. Indeed, after Nazism and the
Shoah, racist pseudo-scientific ideas were definitively rejected on two
counts. First, biology (in particular, population genetics) had refuted racism
in the field of science itself; second, the tragic effects of racist policies had
reinforced, on a universal level (through, for instance, the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights), the values of liberalism and democracy.10 1
So another strategy was devised, notably in France, which led to the ascent
of the New Right (Nouvelle Droite).1o 2 That new orientation had the following advantage: it did not rely on biological, hierarchical, racism. On the
contrary, it was based on two fundamental transformations imposed on the
old pseudo-scientific racism. On the one hand, the various human groups
were no longer considered in biological terms as being characterized by
unchangeable natural traits. Instead, the Nouvelle Droite spoke of cultures,
that is, of communities grounded in different traditions and defending different values and worldviews. On the other hand, the hierarchical element,

100. See CLAUDE LtvI-STRAUSs, RACE AND HISTORY 5 (1952); ALBERT MEMMI, RACISM 186-87
(Steve Martinot trans., Univ. of Minnesota Press 2000) (1982).
101. See MEMMI, supra note 100.
102. See TAGUIEFF, supra note 49.
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which was of course central in nineteenth century racism, was abandoned
and replaced with an apparently egalitarian view: New Right advocates
affirmed that all cultures were equal. But they added a third (essential)
element to their intellectual construction: cultures are fragile organisms,
they should not be mixed in a reckless way, they must be preserved from
mt&issage ("mongrelization"-a term used in the United States at the time
of Segregation1 03). Thus, as far as immigrants coming from other parts of
the world were concerned, the theory was different from old "scientific"
racism, but in practice it remained identical. Culturalism and differentialism led to the same conclusion: the "other" should not mix with us. By
speaking the language of culture and equality, the "wolf' of racism had
entered the "sheepfold" of liberal-democratic values. The language of the
opponent was now our own language and the values he professed were our
own values. Again, the fundamental premises of liberal democracy had
been sophistically perverted by a Perelmanian pseudo-argument, as defined
above.
But as far as racism is concerned, there is another post-Second World
War translation strategy. Instead of speaking the language of cultures and
equality (as opposed to the language of biological races and natural hierarchy), Holocaust deniers argue that the gas chambers never existed. 104 The
idea is to challenge the factual basis of the reaffirmation of human rights
after the Second World War. Here, the strategy does not rely on cultures; it
puts the scientist in the position of the victim, that is, a new Galileo who is
supposedly confronted with-and persecuted by-a new dogmatism. Holocaust deniers replace Ptolemaism and geocentrism with "Exterminationism" (which actually is simply the scientific description of historical
reality). Of course, the writings of Holocaust deniers are no more scientific
than the ones of ID advocates. And they serve much more evil ends: after
all, the intolerance and bigotry of Creationists and "Designers" pale before
the hidden racism of Holocaust deniers.

103. The derogatory term was used in particular by the Ku Klux Klan. See MICHAEL NEWTON, THE
KU KLux KLAN: HISTORY, ORGANIZATION, LANGUAGE, INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITIES OF AMERICA'S
MOST NOTORIOUS SECRET SOCIETY (2007).
104. See VIDAL-NAQUET, supranote 49.
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I might lengthen the list of fields in which the translation strategies
work today. But I just wanted to signal the importance and the power of
Perelmanian pseudo-arguments in contemporary controversies. If the advocates of liberal democracy are not able to refute these sophisms (and first to
see them as such), Vico's lament will continue to haunt us well beyond the
beginning of the twenty-first century.

